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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
Emmaus High School swim team coach, Michael Seip, 
suspected that team member, Leah Gruenke, was pregnant. 
Despite Leah's repeated denials of pregnancy, Seip allegedly 
required Leah to take a pregnancy test. Leah and her 
mother, Joan, have now sued Seip under 42 U.S.C.S 1983, 
claiming that the pregnancy test, and the actions 
surrounding it, constituted an illegal search in violation of 
Leah's Fourth Amendment rights, unconstitutionally 
interfered with Joan and Leah's right to familial privacy, 
violated Leah's right to privacy regarding personal matters, 
and violated Leah's right to free speech and association 
protected by the First Amendment. In their suit, Joan and 
Leah also made claims under Pennsylvania tort law. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Seip on the S 1983 claims on the basis of qualified 
immunity and dismissed the Gruenkes' state law claims 
without prejudice. 
 
For the reasons stated below, we affirm the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment with respect to the 
"familial right to privacy" and the free speech and 
association claims. We reverse and remand, however, with 
respect to the Fourth Amendment and "privacy regarding 
personal matters" claims. Because that reversal restores 
the case to the District Court's docket, we reverse and 
remand its dismissal of the Pennsylvania state tort claims. 
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I. 
 
A. 
 
Seventeen year-old Leah Gruenke was an eleventh grader 
at Emmaus High School and a member of the varsity swim 
team. In January of 1997, Michael Seip, the varsity swim 
coach, began to suspect that Leah was pregnant. At swim 
practice, Seip observed that Leah was often nauseated, 
made frequent trips to the bathroom, and complained 
about having a low energy level. In addition, Leah's body 
was "changing rapidly." In February of 1997, Seip asked his 
assistant swim coach, Kim Kryzan, who also had observed 
the changes in Leah's behavior and physical appearance, to 
approach Leah to discuss the possibility that Leah was 
pregnant. Although the exact content of this discussion is 
not clear, Leah refused to volunteer any information; she 
denied that she was pregnant and refused to acknowledge 
she had had sex with her boyfriend. Shortly after the 
discussion between Leah and Kim Kryzan, Seip approached 
Leah and attempted to discuss sex and pregnancy with her. 
When questioned by Seip, Leah again emphatically denied 
that she was pregnant. 
 
Meanwhile, other members of the swim team began to 
suspect that Leah was pregnant. Leah, however, denied the 
possibility, claiming that she had never had sexual 
intercourse. Leah refused to acknowledge that she might be 
pregnant because she felt that her condition was nobody's 
business. 
 
Leah was also approached by a school guidance 
counselor, at Seip's request, and by the school nurse. Both 
the guidance counselor and the nurse attempted to discuss 
with Leah the possibility of pregnancy, but Leah again 
denied the possibility, refusing to volunteer any 
information. 
 
During this time, the mothers of other swim team 
members also began to suspect Leah's possible pregnancy 
and discussed this hunch with Seip. At least one of the 
mothers suggested that Leah should take a pregnancy test. 
Eventually, Lynn Williams, a mother of a swim team 
member, purchased a pregnancy test and gave it to Seip. 
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He reimbursed Williams for the test and kept it at the 
school. 
 
On March 5, 1997, Leah was approached by two fellow 
swim team members, Abby Hochella and Kathy Ritter, who 
suggested that Leah take a pregnancy test to clear her 
name. Leah refused, stating that she would not take a test 
unless everyone on the team took a test. The next day, 
Leah was again approached by Hochella and Ritter. At this 
point, there is some conflict in the stories. Leah alleges that 
Ritter and Hochella told her that they still had the 
pregnancy test kit, given to them by Seip, and that Seip 
wanted her (Leah) to take the test. Ritter and Hochella, 
however, recount a different version, claiming that they 
merely told Leah that Seip had a pregnancy test if Leah 
wanted to take it. Similarly, Seip contends that he did not 
encourage Leah to take the test nor did he try to get 
Hochella and Ritter to persuade Leah to take a pregnancy 
test. He acknowledges, however, telling Hochella and Ritter 
that if Leah were his friend, he would ask her to take a 
pregnancy test. 
 
Following this second attempt to convince Leah to take a 
pregnancy test, Leah wrote a letter to Seip (which he 
apparently never read) stating that Seip had no right to 
make her take a pregnancy test, that she was not showing 
any symptoms of being pregnant, and that she had never 
had sexual intercourse. According to Leah, she also told 
Ritter and Hochella, in an attempt to get them to stop 
bothering her, that she could not be pregnant because she 
had never had sexual intercourse. 
 
That same day, despite rejecting their earlier attempts, 
Leah was again approached by Ritter and Hochella. 
According to Leah, Ritter and Hochella claimed that unless 
Leah took the pregnancy test, Seip would take her off the 
relay team. Hochella, however, contends that she and Ritter 
tried to convince Leah to take the test by suggesting that a 
negative test result would resolve speculation about her 
condition. Ritter and Hochella further contend that Leah 
ultimately approached them and volunteered to take the 
pregnancy test. 
 
Ritter, Hochella, and another member of the swim team, 
Sara Cierski, were all present when Leah finally took the 
 
                                4 
  
first pregnancy test. The test was positive. Cierski 
suggested that Leah take another test. Cierski, Ritter, and 
Hochella then went to the school parking lot where they got 
money from their parents to purchase two additional 
pregnancy tests. Leah drove with Hochella and Ritter to 
purchase the pregnancy test kits. Leah took both tests; 
both were negative. 
 
Later that night, Leah recounted the events of the day to 
her mother, who was very upset. Hochella called Leah that 
evening and suggested that Leah take another pregnancy 
test. Hochella also told Leah that Hochella's mother would 
be willing to take Leah to the doctor to determine with 
certainty whether Leah was pregnant. Leah got up early the 
next morning and went to school where she took a fourth 
pregnancy test, purchased this time by Hochella and her 
mother. Ritter and Hochella were with Leah in the school 
locker room when she took the test. Again, the test was 
negative. 
 
After learning of the positive test result, Seip asked 
assistant swim coach Dr. Meade, an orthopedist, whether 
in his medical opinion it was acceptable for a pregnant 
swimmer to compete on the team. Dr. Meade advised Seip 
that swimming would not endanger Leah's pregnancy. 
Based on this advice, Seip decided that there was no 
medical reason to prevent Leah from competing on the 
team. The District Court found that beyond consulting a 
school guidance counselor and his assistant coaches, Seip 
did not attempt to talk directly to Leah's parents or to 
inform a higher level of the school's administration that 
Leah was pregnant. The District Court further found that 
Leah continued to deny the possibility that she was 
pregnant until she was examined by Dr. Greybush, on 
March 10, 1997, at an appointment scheduled by her 
mother. There, Leah ultimately learned that she was almost 
six months pregnant. Even then, Leah did not reveal to 
anyone else on the swim team or at school that she was 
pregnant because she wanted to compete in the state swim 
tournament. Eventually, however, Leah's teammates, their 
parents, and Leah's mother learned that Leah was indeed 
pregnant. 
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The Gruenkes allege that after Leah's baby was born, 
Seip tried to alienate Leah from her peers. Specifically, Leah 
testified that after she quit the private swim team that Seip 
also coached, Seip told members of his team not to sit with 
Leah during swim meets. Moreover, Leah asserts that 
during her last year of high school, Seip refused to speak 
to her and retaliated against her by taking her out of 
several swim meets. 
 
B. 
 
On August 26, 1997, Joan Gruenke, for herself and on 
her daughter's behalf, filed suit under 42 U.S.C.S 1983 and 
state tort law, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 8550, et. seq., in U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The 
Gruenkes allege that their rights under the Constitution 
and Pennsylvania state tort law were violated when Seip 
required Leah to take a pregnancy test. 
 
The Gruenkes subsequently amended their complaint on 
November 4, 1997, alleging that the required pregnancy 
test (1) constituted an illegal search in violation of Leah's 
Fourth Amendment rights, (2) violated Joan and Leah's 
right to familial privacy, (3) violated Leah's right to privacy 
regarding personal matters, (4) violated Leah's right to free 
speech and association protected by the First Amendment, 
and (5) violated Joan and Leah's rights under state tort law. 
 
On September 4, 1998, Seip moved for summary 
judgment claiming qualified immunity. The District Court 
granted Seip's motion for summary judgment on the 
Gruenkes' S 1983 claims, holding that Seip was entitled to 
qualified immunity either because he had not violated any 
clearly established constitutional rights, or alternatively, 
that the Gruenkes' claims did not give rise to the violation 
of a constitutional right, clearly established or otherwise. 
See Gruenke v. Seip, 1998 WL 734700, at *8-*15 (E.D. Pa. 
October 21, 1998). In so holding, the District Court did not 
reach the merits of Leah's various constitutional claims. 
The District Court then dismissed the state tort law claims 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On November 9, 
1998, the Gruenkes appealed the District Court's decision. 
 
                                6 
  
II. 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the Gruenkes' S 1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331, 
and over their state tort law claims under 28 U.S.C.S 1367. 
We have appellate jurisdiction over the Gruenkes' claims 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review of the District Court's 
disposition of a S 1983 case on summary judgment alleging 
qualified immunity is plenary: 
 
       [We] review the district court's summary judgment 
       determination de novo, applying the same standard as 
       the district court. . . . [I]n all cases[,] summary 
       judgment should be granted if, after drawing all 
       reasonable inferences from the underlying facts in the 
       light most favorable to the non-moving party, the court 
       concludes that there is no genuine issue of material 
       fact to be resolved at trial[,] and the moving party is 
       entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
 
Kornegay v. Cottingham, 120 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 446 (3d Cir. 
1994)). 
 
III. 
 
Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, 
acting under the color of state law, deprives another 
individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution or laws of the United States. This 
section does not create any new substantive rights but 
instead provides a remedy for the violation of a federal 
constitutional or statutory right. See Baker v. McCollan, 
443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979) ("[S]ection[1983] is not itself 
a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating 
federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the 
United States Constitution and federal statutes that 
[section 1983] describes."). To state a claim under S 1983, 
a plaintiff must show that the defendant, through conduct 
sanctioned under the color of state law, deprived her of a 
federal constitutional or statutory right. See Morse v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 907 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing 
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on 
other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)). 
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In a typical S 1983 action, a court must initially 
determine whether the plaintiff has even alleged the 
deprivation of a right that either federal law or the 
Constitution protects. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 140 ("The 
first inquiry in any S 1983 suit . . . is whether the plaintiff 
has been deprived of a right `secured by the Constitution 
and laws.' "). As the Supreme Court recently emphasized, 
when the defendant in a S 1983 action claims qualified 
immunity, our first task is to assess whether the plaintiff 's 
allegations are sufficient to establish the violation of a 
constitutional or statutory right at all. See, e.g., Conn v. 
Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999); County of Sacramento v. 
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998). 
 
If the plaintiff 's allegations meet this threshold, we must 
next determine whether, as a legal matter, the right that 
the defendant's conduct allegedly violates was a clearly 
established one, about which a reasonable person would 
have known. If so, then the defendant is not entitled to 
qualified immunity. If, in contrast, the plaintiff 's allegations 
fail to satisfy either inquiry, then the defendant is entitled 
to summary judgment. Until the question of qualified 
immunity is addressed, a court cannot reach the 
underlying merits of the case. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800, 813-20 (1982); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 
226, 232 (1991) ("One of the purposes of immunity, 
qualified or absolute, is to spare a defendant not only 
unwarranted liability but unwarranted demands 
customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn 
out lawsuit."); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) 
("The entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a 
mere defense to liability . . . and . . . is effectively lost if a 
case is erroneously permitted to go to trial."). 
 
In the seminal qualified immunity case, Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Supreme Court 
articulated the oft-quoted legal standard for analyzing a 
qualified immunity defense: "[G]overnment officials 
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded 
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. In analyzing a claim for qualified 
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immunity, then, a court must deny the claim if the law is 
clearly established, "since a reasonably competent public 
official should know the law governing his conduct" unless 
he can either demonstrate extraordinary circumstances or 
that he "neither knew nor should have known" about the 
legal right in question. Id. at 818-19. 
 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), clarified the 
Harlow standard in two key ways that bear on our analysis 
of Seip's claim for qualified immunity. First, Anderson held 
that, whether a government official asserting qualified 
immunity could be held personally liable for conduct that 
allegedly violated a constitutional or statutory violate 
depended on the "objective legal reasonableness" of the 
action. Id. at 639. Under this standard, government officials 
are shielded from civil liability not based on their subjective 
understanding of the law but only "as long as their actions 
could reasonably have been thought consistent with the 
rights they are alleged to have violated." Id. Second, 
Anderson defined more specifically the meaning of a "clearly 
established right": 
 
       The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that 
       a reasonable official would understand that what he is 
       doing violates that right. This is not to say that an 
       official action is protected by qualified immunity unless 
       the very action in question has been previously held 
       unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre- 
       existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. 
 
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639. In sum, an official will not be 
liable for allegedly unlawful conduct so long as his actions 
are objectively reasonable under current federal law. See 
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (observing that 
"all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate the law" are protected by qualified immunity). 
 
The evaluation of a qualified immunity defense is 
appropriate for summary judgment because the court's 
inquiry is primarily legal: whether the legal norms the 
defendant's conduct allegedly violated were clearly 
established. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528. Nevertheless, 
some factual allegations, such as how the defendant acted, 
are necessary to resolve the immunity question. See id. We 
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have phrased the inquiry for granting qualified immunity in 
terms of the defendant's conduct: 
 
       [I]t is not sufficient that the right at issue be clearly 
       established as a general matter. Rather, the question is 
       whether a reasonable public official would know that 
       his or her specific conduct violated clearly established 
       rights. 
 
Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(citing Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1111 (3d Cir. 
1990)). We also noted in Grant that this admittedly fact- 
intensive analysis must be conducted by viewing the facts 
alleged in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See 
Grant, 98 F.3d at 122 (discussing inquiry on appeal of 
denial of qualified immunity). Finally, when qualified 
immunity is denied, any genuine disputes over the material 
facts are remanded, to be settled at trial. 
 
With this framework in mind, we will analyze each of the 
Gruenkes' claims in turn. 
 
A. Fourth Amendment 
 
The Gruenkes argue that the pregnancy test taken by 
Leah that was allegedly administered by or at the behest of 
Seip constituted an illegal search under the Fourth 
Amendment. As the District Court correctly noted, a school 
official's administration of a pregnancy test to a student 
"clearly constitutes a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment." Gruenke, 1998 WL 734700, at *7. It 
foundered, however, on whether her right to be free from 
this type of search was clearly established. 
 
Although the District Court analyzed Leah's claim within 
the proper legal framework governing Fourth Amendment 
searches of athletes in public schools, see id. , it misapplied 
the qualified immunity framework to her claim when it 
failed to heed Anderson's caveat that the specific official 
conduct need not have been previously deemed unlawful. 
Instead, the District Court reasoned that, because the 
question of whether the administration by a school official 
of a pregnancy test to a student was one of first impression, 
Leah's right to be free from the search was not clearly 
established: 
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       We decline to decide today whether a Fourth 
       Amendment violation may be established by the facts 
       in this case. We merely wish to indicate that as in 
       Anderson II, we cannot say that the right allegedly 
       violated has been clearly established by prior law. 
       Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987). 
       Taking the Plaintiffs' assertions as true for the 
       purposes of this motion, we certainly do believe the 
       Defendant's conduct was questionable and wonder why 
       he failed to discreetly refer any concerns about Leah 
       Gruenke directly to her parents or to higher levels of 
       the school administration. Indeed, without the qualified 
       immunity issue, we might well find that material issues 
       of fact exist as to whether the Defendant violated 
       Plaintiffs' fourth amendment rights. However, as a 
       matter of law, we cannot say that the law on this issue 
       has been clearly established, and therefore must hold 
       that the Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on 
       this fourth amendment claim. 
 
Id. at *8. This conclusion is wrong. Merely because the 
Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether a school 
official's administration of a pregnancy test to a student 
violates her Fourth Amendment rights does not mean the 
right is not clearly established. Moreover, a review of 
current Fourth Amendment law in the public school context 
reveals not only that the right is clearly established, but 
also that Seip's conduct as alleged was objectively 
unreasonable. 
 
We turn first to the question of whether Leah's right to 
refuse to submit to the pregnancy test was clearly 
established. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution 
protects individuals from unreasonable searches and 
seizures by the government, see U.S. Const., Amend. IV, 
and this prohibition against unreasonable governmental 
intrusions extends to state public school officials as well. 
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985). 
Whether a search is unconstitutional depends on its 
reasonableness. Although probable cause is the common 
touchstone for reasonableness in criminal contexts, in 
other circumstances, there may be "special needs" that 
make probable cause impracticable. See id. at 341 
(requiring individualized suspicion). 
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The public school context is one of those settings. Thus, 
reasonableness is determined by balancing the 
government's interest against the individual's expectation of 
privacy. In the public school context, students have a 
reduced expectation of privacy when compared with the 
public at large. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646, 656-57 (1995) (holding randomly testing student 
athletes for drugs satisfies Fourth Amendment). Student 
athletes, because they not only submit to "suiting up" in 
communal locker rooms, but also frequently agree to follow 
certain regulations, such as taking physical exams and 
acquiring insurance, have an even lower expectation of 
privacy than their fellow students who do not play sports. 
See id. at 657. 
 
The nature of the intrusion must also be considered 
when determining whether the search is unreasonable. A 
urinalysis test, like the one conducted for drugs in 
Vernonia, is clearly intrusive because it reveals personal 
information but can be made less so by having students 
take it in private, tailoring it so that it tests only for drugs, 
and limiting the disclosure of the information it reveals. See 
id. at 658. Finally, the government's interest in the search 
must be balanced against the intrusion. This interest must 
be compelling, one that is "important enough to justify the 
particular search at hand, in light of other factors that 
show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine 
expectation of privacy." Id. at 660. 
 
We believe that the standard set forth in Vernonia clearly 
establishes that a school official's alleged administration to 
a student athlete of the pregnancy tests would constitute 
an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 
Although student athletes have a very limited expectation of 
privacy, a school cannot compel a student to take a 
pregnancy test absent a legitimate health concern about a 
possible pregnancy and the exercise of some discretion. 
This is not to say that a student, athlete or not, cannot be 
required to take a pregnancy test. There may be unusual 
instances where a school nurse or another appropriate 
school official has legitimate concerns about the health of 
the student or her unborn child. An official cannot, 
however, require a student to submit to this intrusion 
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merely to satisfy his curiosity. While it might be shown at 
trial that the facts are more favorable to Seip, we cannot 
say, as a matter of law, that his conduct as alleged by the 
Gruenkes did not violate a clearly established constitutional 
right. 
 
Nor do we consider Seip's alleged conduct to have been 
reasonable under this standard. The requirement that an 
official's conduct be objectively reasonable casts a wide net 
of protection to most officials but it does not insulate all 
official conduct. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 ("[Qualified 
immunity . . . provide[s] no license to unlawful conduct."). 
When the defendant violates a clearly established right 
about which a reasonable person would have known, he is 
not entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Parkhurst v. 
Trapp, 77 F.3d 707, 712-13 (3d Cir. 1996); Simmons v. City 
of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1088-89 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Even if the right is clearly established, officials will not be 
held liable if they were "acting reasonably in good-faith 
fulfillment of their responsibilities." Wilson v. Schillinger, 
761 F.2d 921, 929 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Hynson v. City 
of Chester, 827 F.2d 932, 933 (3d Cir. 1987) (same). Public 
school officials have the same guarantee. Qualified 
immunity "must be such that public school officials 
understand that action taken . . . within the bounds of 
reason under all circumstances will not be punished and 
[those officials] need not exercise their discretion with 
timidity." Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975) 
(emphasis added). 
 
However, under current precedent, we cannot say that 
Seip's conduct passes this objective test. Here, the swim 
coach, an individual without any medical background, 
allegedly forced Leah to take a pregnancy test. His 
responsibilities can be reasonably construed to include 
activities related to teaching and training. They cannot be 
extended to requiring a pregnancy test. Moreover, a 
reasonable swim coach would recognize that his student 
swimmer's condition was not suitable for public 
speculation. He would have exercised some discretion in 
how he handled the problem. Seip, however, has offered no 
explanation that could justify his failure to respect the 
boundaries of reasonableness.  
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We hold, therefore, that Seip is not entitled to qualified 
immunity from Leah's Fourth Amendment, S 1983 claim, 
because Seip should have reasonably known that his 
conduct would violate a clearly established right. For this 
reason, we reverse the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment with respect to Leah's Fourth Amendment claim 
and remand this claim to the District Court.2 
 
B. Substantive Due Process 
 
1. Right to Privacy 
 
The Gruenkes next argue that Seip violated Leah's 
substantive due process right to privacy. In evaluating the 
Gruenkes' claim, the District Court analyzed two lines of 
relevant Supreme Court cases: (1) cases implicating an 
individual's interest in independence when making certain 
decisions; and (2) cases implicating an individual's interest 
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. See Gruenke, 
1998 WL 734700, at *11. The District Court first decided 
that the Gruenkes' claim did not fall under thefirst line of 
cases, because Leah's decision-making with respect to a 
fundamental right had not been impaired. See id.  
 
With respect to Leah's other substantive due process 
claim, the right to keep certain personal matters private, 
however, the District Court acknowledged that "[t]he Third 
Circuit has clearly recognized that private medical 
information is `well within the ambit of materials entitled to 
privacy protection' " under the substantive due process 
clause. Id. (citing United States v. Westinghouse Electric 
Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980)). The District Court 
concluded, however, that because the Third Circuit"ha[d] 
not yet addressed the compelled disclosure by a school 
official of a student's health records," the right to be free 
from such disclosure was not a clearly established one. 
Gruenke, 1998 WL 734700, at *12. In arriving at this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In so holding, we leave for another day the question of whether, under 
facts otherwise analogous to those presented today, an appropriate 
school official would be entitled to qualified immunity for requiring a 
pregnancy test under Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 
(1995). 
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outcome, the District Court reasoned that, although the 
"[p]laintiffs [sic] claim does . . . fall under the right to be 
free from disclosure of personal matters, . . . .[w]ithout any 
cases where some factual correspondence exists with the 
present case, . . . this court must conclude that there is no 
relevant clearly established law and that the Defendant is 
entitled to qualified immunity." Id. 
 
As it did in analyzing Leah's Fourth Amendment claim, 
the District Court misconstrued the test for determining 
whether an allegedly violated right is clearly established. As 
we stated above, the test is not whether the current 
precedents protect the specific right alleged but whether the 
contours of current law put a reasonable defendant on 
notice that his conduct would infringe on the plaintiff 's 
asserted right. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639. Leah's claim 
not only falls squarely within the contours of the recognized 
right of one to be free from disclosure of personal matters, 
see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977), but also 
concerns medical information, which we have previously 
held is entitled to this very protection. See Westinghouse 
Electric Corp., 638 F.2d at 577. While the preservation of 
this right must be balanced with factors such as concerns 
for public health in the work environments, see Doe v. 
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1139 (3d 
Cir. 1995), Leah's version of the facts satisfies this test. 
While it may prove, at trial, that her facts misstate the 
case, that possibility does not entitle Seip to qualified 
immunity at the summary judgment stage. 
 
We are also concerned by the District Court's assertion 
that "[e]ven considering the facts in a light most favorable 
to the Plaintiffs, it is . . . highly uncertain  that Leah 
Gruenke's test information was in fact confidential or that 
its disclosure was compelled by the Defendant." Id. 
(emphasis added). The District Court's characterization as 
"highly uncertain" of the likelihood that Leah's test 
information was confidential or that its disclosure was 
compelled by Seip belies its grant of summary judgment. If, 
as Leah alleges, the information about her pregnancy tests 
was confidential,3 and Seip compelled Leah to take the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. As the District Court noted, it is at best unclear whether Leah's 
pregnancy was actually "confidential"; her condition may have been 
readily observable to the public because of her physical appearance. See 
Gruenke, 1998 WL 734700, at *12. 
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tests, his alleged failure to take appropriate steps to keep 
that information confidential, by Seip's having Leah's 
teammates administer the test and by his discussing the 
test results with his assistant coaches, could infringe 
Leah's right to privacy under the substantive due process 
clause. This type of conduct is not objectively reasonable 
under current law and does not entitle Seip to immunity 
from suit. Moreover, Leah's testimony creates genuine 
issues of material fact, which make the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment inappropriate. We therefore 
reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment 
with respect to Leah's right to privacy claim and remand 
this claim to the District Court. 
 
2. Right to Familial Integrity4  
 
The Gruenkes also argue that Seip violated their 
substantive due process right to be free from state 
interference with family relations. While acknowledging that 
"the Supreme Court has clearly recognized a fundamental 
liberty interest in familial integrity and privacy," the District 
Court held that the Gruenkes' claim that Seip violated 
Leah's right to familial privacy and Joan's right to influence 
and guide her daughter during her pregnancy did not rise 
to the level of a constitutional violation, or, even if it did, 
the constitutional right in question was not clearly 
established. Gruenke, 1998 WL 734700, at *11. As such, 
the District Court granted Seip's motion for summary 
judgment, concluding that the Gruenkes' failure to 
establish the violation of a clearly established constitutional 
right on either basis meant that Seip was entitled to 
qualified immunity. Although we ultimately agree that Seip 
is entitled to qualified immunity, we disagree with the 
District Court's reasoning. 
 
The right of parents to raise their children without undue 
state interference is well established. As the Supreme Court 
remarked in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996), "[c]hoices 
about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children 
are among associational rights this Court has ranked as of 
basic importance in our society, rights sheltered by the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Part III.B.2 represents the views of Judges Weis and Shadur only. 
Judge Roth's views are set forth in a separate concurring opinion. 
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Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted 
usurpation, disregard, or disrespect." Id.  at 116 (citation 
and internal quotes omitted). 
 
In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), the Court 
pointed out that "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of 
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of 
their child does not evaporate simply because they have not 
been model parents . . . ." Id. at 753. Indeed, it is " `plain 
beyond the need for multiple citation' that a natural 
parent's `desire for and right to the companionship, care, 
custody, and management of his or her children' is an 
interest far more precious than any property right." Id. at 
758-59 (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 
U.S. 18, 27 (1981)) (some internal quotes omitted). 
 
In Troxel v. Granville, No. 99-138, 2000 WL 712807 (U.S. 
June 5, 2000), the Court reiterated that the parental 
interest in "the care, custody, and control of their children" 
is "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized by this Court." Id. at *5. That case reaffirmed 
the validity of such long-standing precedents as Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (right of parents to 
control education of their children), Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (right to direct 
upbringing and education of children), and Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), where the Court 
said "the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first 
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom 
include preparation for obligations the state can neither 
supply nor hinder." See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 
205, 232-33 (1972) ("primary role of the parents in the 
upbringing of their children is now established beyond 
debate as an enduring American tradition," particularly in 
matters of "moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements 
of good citizenship"). 
 
Notwithstanding these near-absolutist pronouncements, 
the Court has also recognized that for some portions of the 
day, children are in the compulsory custody of state- 
operated school systems. In that setting, the state's power 
is "custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of 
supervision and control that could not be exercised over 
free adults." Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton , 515 U.S. 646, 655 
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(1995). For some purposes, then, "school authorities act[ ] 
in loco parentis." Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 
684 (1986). But see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
336-37 (1985) (school authorities are not merely parental 
surrogates but also exercise public authority for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.). 
 
Thus, there may be circumstances in which school 
authorities, in order to maintain order and a proper 
educational atmosphere in the exercise of police power, 
may impose standards of conduct on students that differ 
from those approved by some parents. See, e.g. , Vernonia, 
515 U.S. at 664-65 (allowing participation in school 
athletics to be conditioned upon testing for illegal drugs); 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 
(1988) (permitting censorship of school-sponsored 
publication); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347-48 (upholding 
warrantless search of student's effects). 
 
Although a student may not enjoy a right of privacy to 
the same extent as a free adult, there are nevertheless 
limitations on intrusions by school authorities. Thus, in 
Vernonia, although the Court approved drug tests, it was 
also careful to indicate that the tests were inappropriate to 
determine "whether the student is, for example, epileptic, 
pregnant, or diabetic." 515 U.S. at 658. In describing the 
justification for the random, coerced drug testing in 
Vernonia, the Court pointed out that the State must 
demonstrate "an interest that appears important enough to 
justify the particular search at hand, in light of other 
factors that show the search to be relatively intrusive upon 
a genuine expectation of privacy." Id. at 661. 
 
It is not unforeseeable, therefore, that a school's policies 
might come into conflict with the fundamental right of 
parents to raise and nurture their child. But when such 
collisions occur, the primacy of the parents' authority must 
be recognized and should yield only where the school's 
action is tied to a compelling interest. 
 
As the Court said in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609 (1984), "[t]he Court has long recognized that, 
because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual 
liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of 
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certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial 
measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the 
State." Id. at 618. Familial relationships are the 
quintessential "personal bonds" that "act as critical buffers 
between the individual and the power of the State." Id. at 
619-20. 
 
In determining whether plaintiffs have presented a 
constitutional issue that will survive summary judgment, 
the reviewing court draws all reasonable inferences from 
the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Sameric Corp. v. City of Phila. , 142 F.3d 
582, 590 (3d Cir. 1998). In this case, review is complicated 
because in critical instances, the facts and inferences are 
sharply contested and the testimony on some points is 
quite vague. We are, however, persuaded that there is 
sufficient evidence, coupled with such reasonable 
inferences, to establish an unconstitutional interference 
with familial relations. 
 
Defendant Seip conceded that he could not exclude Leah 
from the team or bar her from participating in swim meets 
merely because she was pregnant. He was aware that some 
women compete in such strenuous activities as triathlons 
in the seventh month of pregnancy. He was, of course, free 
to limit her participation because of poor performance, but 
did not until the state meet on March 15, 1997. 
 
In December 1996, Leah's father commented to Seip that 
Leah's racing times had increased. Seip said that she 
appeared to be heavier in the water. Even though he had 
suspicions, he made no comment to Leah's father about 
possible pregnancy at that time or in the following month 
in a subsequent discussion. 
 
In January 1997, the parents arranged for Leah to have 
a medical examination because of her decreased stamina 
and slower racing times. A physician diagnosed a vitamin 
deficiency and prescribed dietary supplements. Her 
examination did not reveal the pregnancy, although no 
pregnancy test was administered. The physician said that 
additional tests would be required to definitively rule it out. 
Leah declined the additional tests because, based on her 
previous health history, her symptoms did not indicate 
pregnancy. 
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Leah and her mother discussed the possibility of 
pregnancy at that time, but took no further steps then. 
Mrs. Gruenke also discussed Leah's condition with a nurse 
friend, who also suggested a vitamin deficiency. The 
parents testified that Leah was a very athletic person and 
her appearance did not suggest pregnancy, at least not 
until the end of March. 
 
The record does not disclose whether Seip was aware that 
Leah had a medical examination in January 1997, but by 
the following month, he had engaged in discussions of 
Leah's possible pregnancy with some of her teammates, 
their mothers, assistant coaches and a guidance counselor. 
He also had an assistant coach attempt to determine 
whether Leah might admit to pregnancy. In addition, Seip 
had a conversation with Leah about sexual conduct that 
could lead to pregnancy. 
 
Despite his suspicions of Leah's pregnancy, Seip did not 
contact Mrs. Gruenke because "she would hang up on 
him." He apparently did not consider sending a note 
circumspectly outlining the symptoms he had observed, 
and he failed to mention his suspicions to her father when 
asked about changes in her performance. 
 
Seip did nothing to stop the gossip; rather, he added 
credence to it when he would, on occasion, tell others that 
it was possible that Leah was pregnant. The continuing 
discussions with a number of persons developed for some 
weeks until the affair culminated in Leah's submission, 
under pressure, to a pregnancy test. She said that she had 
agreed to the test as a result of threats to bar her from 
swimming in the state championship meet taking place in 
less than ten days. Seip did not make these statements to 
her directly, but through her teammates. He also furnished 
the pregnancy test kit, which he had previously acquired 
and had kept at the school. 
 
Leah took the test while several teammates waited 
nearby. One of them informed Seip that the result was 
positive. Other tests performed that evening and the 
following morning were negative. The news of the initial 
results, however, spread rapidly through the high school 
community. One of the girls told the putative father, among 
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others. Leah told her mother about the readings and she 
immediately made an appointment with a physician, who 
confirmed that Leah was pregnant. 
 
As the parents explained, had not all the adverse 
publicity occurred as the result of Seip's actions, they 
would have quietly withdrawn Leah from school, apparently 
after the state meet, and sent her to Florida to live with her 
married sister. After the child was born, it might have been 
adopted by the sister or another sibling, but because Seip's 
conduct made the family's dilemma a topic of conversation 
for the school community, any discreet measures that the 
parents would have taken were no longer feasible. 
 
Mrs. Gruenke alleges, therefore, that Seip's continued 
intrusion into what was a private family matter, his failure 
to notify her while instead aiding and abetting the members 
of the team and their mothers in making Leah's pregnancy 
a subject of gossip in the school community, violated her 
constitutional right to manage the upbringing of her child. 
Mrs. Gruenke's position is that the management of this 
teenage pregnancy was a family crisis in which the State, 
through Seip, had no right to obstruct the parental right to 
choose the proper method of resolution. As is apparent, 
Leah's claim of deprivation of privacy, which has been 
remanded for trial, overlaps with and is largely inseparable 
from that of familial rights. 
 
In reviewing the record, one is struck by the fact that the 
guidance counselor, aware of the situation, apparently did 
not advise Seip to notify the parents. Nor did the counselor 
herself undertake that responsibility. Even the principal 
(himself a former guidance counselor), who did not became 
aware of the matter until late in the game, did not even 
comment that this was a matter for the parents and not 
school authorities. His reprimand to Seip did not mention 
the supremacy of the parents' interest in matters of this 
nature. 
 
This case presents another example of the arrogation of 
the parental role by a school similar to, although not as 
egregious as, Arnold v. Board of Education, 880 F.2d 305 
(11th Cir. 1989). In that case, the parents alleged that 
school officials coerced a student into having an abortion 
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and urged her not to discuss the matter with her parents. 
The Court held that in so acting, the school counselor 
interfered with the parents' right to direct the rearing of 
their child. Id. at 312. 
 
The Arnold Court declined to hold that counselors are 
constitutionally mandated to notify parents when their 
minor child receives counseling about pregnancy, but 
nevertheless indicated, "[a]s a matter of common sense," 
counselors should encourage communication. Id.  at 314. In 
this case, however, Seip was not a counselor whose 
guidance was sought by a student, but instead, someone 
who was acting contrary to her express wishes that he 
mind his own business. 
 
We need not consider the potential liability of school 
counselors here, although we have considerable doubt 
about their right to withhold information of this nature 
from the parents. Because public school officials are state 
actors, they must not lose sight of the fact that their 
professional association ethical codes, as well as state 
statutes, must yield to the Constitution.5  
 
School-sponsored counseling and psychological testing 
that pry into private family activities can overstep the 
boundaries of school authority and impermissibly usurp 
the fundamental rights of parents to bring up their 
children, as they are guaranteed by the Constitution. See 
Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913, 922 (E.D. Pa. 
1973) (questionnaire probing family relationships by school 
authorities held unconstitutional). Public schools must not 
forget that "in loco parentis" does not mean "displace 
parents." 
 
It is not educators, but parents who have primary rights 
in the upbringing of children. School officials have only a 
secondary responsibility and must respect these rights. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. See Stephen R. Ripps et al., To Disclose or Not to Disclose: The 
Dilemma of the School Counselor, 13 MISS. C. L. REV. 323, 328-29 (1993) 
("[T]here is a developing trend in state and federal case law recognizing 
the existence of a legal duty or special relationship between the school 
district and a student's parents necessitating disclosure of personal 
information about the student in certain circumstances."). 
 
                                22 
  
State deference to parental control over children is 
underscored by the Court's admonitions that "[t]he child is 
not the mere creature of the State," Pierce , 268 U.S. at 535, 
and that it is the parents' responsibility to inculcate "moral 
standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good 
citizenship." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233. 
 
Although the parents have sufficiently alleged a 
constitutional violation,6 the record must establish that the 
right violated was clearly established in order to defeat 
Seip's claim of immunity. At this point, the plaintiffs' claim 
falters. Although the general principles were articulated by 
the Supreme Court opinions, their application to the 
unique circumstances of this case cannot be said to have 
been clearly established. We conclude that on that basis, 
Seip is entitled to qualified immunity and judgment in his 
favor on the familial claim. See Sameric Corp. v. City of 
Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 n.6 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
C. First Amendment 
 
Finally, the Gruenkes argue that Seip violated Leah's 
First Amendment rights by forbidding members of his 
private swim team from associating with Leah. Holding that 
the Gruenkes had failed to show that Seip had violated 
Leah's First Amendment rights, and therefore had failed to 
show any violation under S 1983, the District Court also 
granted Seip qualified immunity on this fourth claim. See 
Gruenke, 1998 WL 734700 at *13. Characterizing Leah's 
asserted right to associate with her former team members 
as purely social, the District Court analogized this right to 
the other types of social associations that the Supreme 
Court has previously denied constitutional protection. See 
id. ("[T]he activity of talking to swim team members during 
a swimming competition is not an individual liberty interest 
protected by the First Amendment.") 
 
We agree with the District Court's reasoning, although we 
will modify its outcome. While the Constitution also guards 
those associational activities necessary to further other 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Any such violation does not, however, extend to the allegations of 
interference in the relationship between Leah and her unborn child. 
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activities, such as speech and assembly, that the First 
Amendment directly protects, purely social rights to 
association lack this same heightened constitutional 
protection. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 
25 (1989) (denying constitutional protection to young 
adults' asserted right to socialize in public settings). Seip's 
alleged interference with Leah's interaction with other 
swimmers clearly does not amount to a violation of a 
protected right.7 We will thus affirm the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Seip. See Sameric 
Corp., 142 F.3d at 590 n.6. 
 
D. Related State Tort Law Claims 
 
The Gruenkes' state law tort claims were before the 
District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367. Because the 
District Court dismissed the Gruenkes' S 1983 claims on 
summary judgment, the court also dismissed the Gruenkes' 
supplemental state tort law claims noting that "the absence 
of any federal question or constitutional issue" made 
dismissal of the state tort law claims appropriate. Gruenke, 
1998 WL 734700 at *14. Because we reverse the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment with respect to the 
Gruenkes' Fourth Amendment and right to privacy claims, 
thus restoring the case to active status, we will also reverse 
and remand the District Court's dismissal of the Gruenkes' 
state tort law claims. 
 
IV. 
 
In conclusion, we hold that the District Court erred in 
granting Seip's motion for summary judgment with respect 
to Leah's Fourth Amendment claim and Leah's right to 
privacy claim, and we reverse and remand these claims for 
further consideration consistent with this opinion. We 
affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment with 
respect to the Gruenkes' right to familial integrity claim and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We also agree with the District Court's conclusion that Leah's asserted 
right to social association does not fall within the ambit of the right to 
education that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
protects. 
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Leah's First Amendment claim because Seip is entitled to 
qualified immunity with respect to these claims. We also 
reverse the order dismissing the Gruenkes' supplemental 
state law tort claims and remand them to the District 
Court. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part: 
 
I write separately on the issue of interference with 
familial relations. While I concur with the majority's ruling 
that Seip is entitled to summary judgment on the claim for 
interference with familial relations, I disagree that the 
Gruenkes have alleged such a constitutional violation. 
 
The factual basis for the Gruenkes' claim of interference 
with family relations lies in their claims that Seip destroyed 
Joan Gruenke's right to raise and advise Leah, her 
daughter, without outside influences of the public, 
Appellants' Opening Br. at 47, and that he destroyed Leah's 
right as a child and a potential parent to abort the fetus or 
carry it to term. See id. at 49. They assert that Seip 
disclosed the results of the pregnancy test to Leah's 
classmates and to Seip's assistant coaches but not to 
Leah's parents or to the higher school administrators. See 
id. at 51. The Gruenkes qualify their claims by 
acknowledging that while Seip "did not personally coerce 
Leah to make any decision regarding her pregnancy,[he] 
did set in motion a chain of events that prevented[the 
Gruenkes] from making childbirth and reproductive 
decisions autonomously." Id. at 51-52. While it is 
unfortunate that, as a result of Seip's actions, the 
Gruenkes may have had certain personal family matters 
disclosed in an unwanted manner, I do not believe that this 
subsequent disclosure violated a constitutional right. 
 
I reach this conclusion because the type of interference 
that the Gruenkes assert does not fall within the scope of 
actions that constitutionally infringe on familial privacy. In 
evaluating the Gruenkes' claims of an unconstitutional 
interference with parents' fundamental right to make 
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of 
children, I will turn first to Troxel v. Granville, 120 S.Ct. 
2154 (2000), the most recent Supreme Court case dealing 
with this issue.1 In Troxel , a plurality of the Court found 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We note, however, that, to the extent Troxel expanded the boundaries 
of parental rights, it cannot for qualified immunity purposes apply to 
Seip's past actions since, as a case decided this Term, it could not, by 
definition, retroactively govern his actions in 1997. See Harlow, 457 U.S. 
at 818 (noting that law must be clearly established at "the time an action 
occurred.") 
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that a Washington statute, providing for the rights of 
visitation with minor children, violated the substantive due 
process rights of the mother because of its "breathtaking" 
scope: Any person could petition at any time for visitation 
of a child with the only requirement being that the 
visitation serve the best interest of the child. Id. at 2061. A 
parent's decision that visitation would not be in the child's 
best interest was given no deference; the best interest 
determination was placed solely in the hands of the judge. 
See id. In writing for the plurality, Justice O'Connor stated 
that "so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her 
children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the 
State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to 
further question the ability of that parent to make the best 
decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children." 
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Reno v. Flores , 507 U.S. 292, 
304 (1992)). 
 
This reasoning in Troxel is consistent with the Court's 
earlier decisions defining the scope of the liberty interest of 
parents to control the upbringing of their children without 
interference from the state. These cases, upon which Troxel 
relies, involve the injection of the state into the process of 
raising children. For example, in two of these cases, the 
Court declared unconstitutional laws that impeded parents' 
decisions on their children's education by prohibiting 
private schools, see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925), or the teaching of foreign languages in schools, 
see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 
In a third one, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), 
the Court held that, to terminate parental rights, a state 
must present clear and convincing evidence of unfitness. In 
yet another, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996), the Court 
held that a right to appeal in forma pauperis  must be 
granted by the state when parental rights are terminated. 
Finally, in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), the 
Court rejected the efforts of the father of an illegitimate 
child to veto the adoption of that child by the natural 
mother's husband. Instead, it concluded that a natural 
father who had failed to claim paternity until the adoption 
was proposed could not rely on state law to overturn the 
state's full recognition of an already existing family unit 
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that was in the child's best interests. See id.  at 255-56. 
Each of these cases share a common theme: They involve a 
situation in which the state has attempted by statute or by 
a court's procedural requirements to eliminate a parent's 
role in the custody or nurture of the child. 
 
The situation before in this case is very different. The 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not attempted by 
statute or by court proceedings to determine the outcome of 
Leah's pregnancy or to dictate whether she should keep the 
child or give it up for adoption. Nor did Seip physically 
prevent Leah or her parents from taking any action as a 
consequence of her pregnancy. The claim here is that Seip's 
discussion of Leah's pregnancy with others and his failure 
to inform the Gruenkes of the pregnancy merely 
complicated the Gruenkes' ability to make decisions 
concerning the pregnancy. This alleged breach of privacy 
and failure by a school official to impart information to the 
family is not an action by the state to control the education 
of a child against the parents' wishes or to determine 
custody or visitation without proper input by the parents. 
In fact, the Gruenkes were free at all times to make 
whatever decision they pleased as to the outcome of Leah's 
pregnancy, even after Seip discussed her condition with 
other parents or swim team members. 
 
Accepting the facts as proffered by the Gruenkes, I 
conclude that the Gruenkes have failed to establish the 
violation of a constitutional right to familial integrity. 
Consequently, Seip is entitled to summary judgment on 
this claim, see Sameric Corp., 142 F.3d at 590 n.6, but, I 
believe, not for the reasons cited by the majority. 
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